Abstract: Both theoretical and experimental research by economists and social psychologists suggests biases in how people draw inferences about the preferences and characteristics of others. Eyster and Rabin (2005) review extensive experimental evidence from a broad array of settings that suggests people do not fully take into account how other people's actions depend on their private information and, thereby, systematically underestimate the relationship between others' actions and types. Using application and admission data from two liberal arts colleges with optional SAT I policies, this paper is the first to use non-experimental data to estimate the extent to which players underestimate this relationship. This policy provides applicants with a choice of whether to voluntarily disclose their SATI scores to the college. Our empirical estimates are consistent with the experimental researchcolleges underestimate the relationship between an applicant's action (not submitting) and type (actual SATI score). In practice, the underestimate has very little effect on the student body composition because the colleges have a great deal of other information to base their acceptance decision and to infer SATI scores. In other private information environments with less public information, a player would likely incur greater costs associated with incorrectly inferring the other players' private information based on their actions.
I. Introduction
The college admissions process is filled with uncertainty in which both students and colleges have private information and are making inferences about the other party's preferences or characteristics. With increasing competition among colleges to attract the best students, the stakes are high for accurate inference -as colleges attempt to identify and attract the students who will give the most value added to their institution. The economics literature typically assumes this inference is based on Bayes Rule. 1 However, a paper by Eyster and Rabin (2005) questions whether players actually apply Bayes Rule when forming their beliefs. Eyster and Rabin present a psychologically motivated equilibrium concept where players do not accurately map private information to actions and thus make inferences not consistent with Bayes Rule.
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The so-called cursed equilibrium allows for the possibility that players underestimate the relationship between other players' actions and their private information and is supported by experimental evidence in common value auctions, bilateral trades, and voting games. This paper is the first that uses field data to formally test whether players underestimate the relationship between other players' actions and their private information. 4 College admissions 1 Since Harsanyi first developed the approach of modeling games of incomplete information as games of imperfect information, game theorists have developed numerous equilibrium concepts applicable to these incomplete information games. One of the first concepts developed, Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, requires all players' strategies to be sequentially rational and for players beliefs at all information sets to be derived from Bayes Rule whenever possible. Subsequent refinements also applied Bayes Rule at all information sets reached with positive probability, while imposing different restrictions on beliefs at information sets reached with zero probability. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Kreps and Wilson (1982) , Cho and Kreps (1987) , and Banks and Sobel (1987) for the details associated with these equilibrium refinements. 2 Other economists and social psychologists consider how uninformed players make inferences that differ from Bayes Rule; including Jehiel's (2005) and Jehiel and Koessler's (2008) analogy-based expectations as well as Ross's (1977) fundamental attribution error. An advantage to Eyster and Rabin's work is that they parameterize the manner by which the uniformed player draws inferences which facilitates empirical analysis. 3 Eyster and Rabin use the term cursed equilibrium because of its ability to explain the prevalence of the "winner's curse". However, they also apply it to many other settings including voluntary disclosure/verifiable cheap talk games.
provide a setting where the college's inference on the applicant's perceived quality influences the college's acceptance decision. We estimate this inference using application and admission data from two liberal arts schools (Colleges X and Y) that have an optional SATI policy. This policy allows applicants to choose whether or not to submit their standardized math and verbal SATI scores to the college -generating, for those applicants who do not submit, yet another dimension along which the college must make an inference. Through an agreement with the College Board, we obtained the SATI scores of the applicants who chose not to submit. This allows us to structurally estimate a model and quantify the degree to which the colleges underestimate the relationship between an applicant's decision not to submit and the applicant's actual SATI scores. Because we are unable to directly observe what SATI score the colleges infer for applicants who choose not to submit, we use the admission decisions to estimate this inference. We parameterize this inference in the manner proposed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) . 5 For the sixteen percent of College X applicants and the twenty four percent of College Y applicants who chose not to submit, we find that both colleges underestimate the relationship between the applicants' decision not to submit and the applicant's actual SATI score. The results from our structural estimation suggest that while the average SATI score for the College X applicants who do not submit is 1,139, the admission department infers an average SATI score of 1,159 for these applicants. For College Y applicants who did not submit, their average SATI score is 1,228 and we estimate that the college infers an average score of 1,238. 6 The fact the colleges infer only slightly higher average scores reflects the fact that the other information in the college application (such as high school grade point average, class rank, SATII score, ACT score, gender, race, and so 5 While using Eyster and Rabin's parameterization, we do not impose their cursed equilibrium concept on the empirical specification because we believe the applicants have very minimal experience/knowledge of how their SATI submission decision will affect the college's acceptance decision. See Fudenberg (2006) for an interesting perspective on the cursed equilibrium. 6 This difference between the actual and inferred SATI score is statistically significant for College Y but not for College X. on) are relatively accurate predictors of an applicant's actual SATI score. In the college admission setting where so much applicant information is available, the additional information the college obtains from an applicant's actual SATI score is not large, which explains why our simulations suggest that the composition of the student body would not change appreciably if the colleges correctly inferred SATI scores or if the colleges required all applicants to submit their SATI scores.
Our empirical evidence of the extent to which players inaccurately map other player's private information into their actions is consistent with the experimental evidence. By structurally estimating the model, we lay the groundwork for further tests in other economic environments where private information results in adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling and screening issues. We expect biased inferences to have much larger economic affects in other private information games where there is less public information.
II. Application/Admission Process and Data

2.A Application/Admission Process
The college admission process culminates with colleges making acceptance decisions and students accepting or declining those offers of acceptance. During the process, colleges and students exchange much information; colleges make inferences on which students are "best" for the school; and student make inferences about whether the school is their best option. Generally, the formal application process begins by students filling out an application to the school that includes basic information about demographics, high school experience, financial aid intent, extracurricular activities, and a personal essay. Students also provide information to the colleges through campus visits and interviews, as well as interactions with their guidance counselors and college admissions personnel. Finally, students typically provide a standardized test score to the college.
In the Northeast, where the schools in our data are located, the SATIs the standardized test potential college students typically take.
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A high school student takes their SAT exams in their junior and/or senior year during one of the seven annual test dates offered by the College Board. At the time of our data (the early 2000s), the SATI consisted of a two-part standardized verbal and math exam each scored on an 800 point scale.
8 Some students might also choose to take a subset of the 20 different SATII exams on subjects including English, history, mathematics, science and languages scored on an 800 point scale. Under the College Board's Score Choice Option, in place during the time of our data, the College Board did not release scores to colleges until the student saw and approved their release.
Over time, an increasing number of schools offer applicants the option to not report their two-part SATI score by checking a box on the application form that formally requests that these scores not be considered in the application process. Depending on the school, they may request alternative measures of college preparedness or simply consider all the other material provided by the student in making their admissions decision. The policy introduces more uncertainty over the student's ability for those who chose not to submit and generates another dimension over which colleges make inferences.
Another significant decision in the college application process is whether to apply early decision or regular decision to colleges. Early decision applicants apply in November. The acceptance decision arrives in December and, if accepted, the applicant withdraws her applications from other pending schools to enroll in the college she applied early decision to.
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Because of the 7 The SAT is the most common standardized test taken along the East and West coasts, as well as in Texas. The ACT is more common in the south and Midwest. http://www.princetonreview.com/testprep/testprepimages/RedStatesBlueStates.pdf. 8 Students often take the SATI and SATII exams multiple times (Vigdor and Clotfelter, 2003) . 9 Upon submitting an early decision application to a college, the applicant and her guidance counselor must sign a written agreement stating that the applicant will attend the school if she is admitted. The agreement is not legally binding and the applicant may be released from this obligation if financial need is not met (Avery et al. 2003) . However, reneging on an early decision acceptance may be costly because it may be too late to reapply to alternative schools and not enrolling could adversely affect the reputation of her guidance counselor. binding nature of early decision, it provides information to the college about the student's willingness to attend if accepted. Its significance is measured by the fact that at many schools offering early decision, more than 40 percent of enrolled students applied early decision (Avery et al. 2003) . If an applicant chooses not to apply early decision, the deadline for regular admission applications is January 1 st . Upon notification of acceptance or denial between March and April, accepted students must commit to enroll by May 1 st .
2.B Data Description and Summary Statistics
Our primary data come from the admissions databases from two schools in the Northeast, each with approximately 1800 students enrolled.
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Through an agreement with the colleges and the College Board, we supplement the colleges' data with College Board data on SATI scores for the applicants who chose not to submit.
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These College Board data also include SATII scores and responses to the student descriptive questionnaire (SDQ), which includes self-reported data on family income as well as standardized measures of high school grades 12 and class rank. For College X, we have two years of applicant data, about five years into the school's optional SAT policy during which 16 percent of the 6,557 applicants chose not to submit their SATI scores. For College Y, we have one year of applicant data, the first year that the school instituted the optional SAT policy, during which 24 percent of the 3,602 applicants from College Y chose not to submit their SATI scores.
Summary statistics for Colleges X and Y are in Table 1 .
Overall, applicants to both colleges are likely to attend private high schools (around 40 percent), and come from high income families (more than 20 percent report family income in excess 10 We signed agreements with the colleges and College Board to allow us to use the data. This agreement stipulates that we cannot reveal the names of the colleges. 11 The colleges obtain these SAT data for a minority of these applicants, particularly those who ultimately enroll. We drop the international applicants from our analysis because the probability of obtaining a match with the College Board data is low without a Social Security numbers. We also drop fewer than two percent of domestic students for whom we cannot identify an SAT I score. Finally, we exclude applicants who withdrew from consideration before admission decisions were made, which is about 13 percent from College X and 5 percent from College Y. 12 We use these self-reported GPAs because GPA scales as reported on applications are not even remotely standardized across high schools and therefore comparisons are extremely difficult (see Chaker, 2003) . College Y did not even record high school GPA for many of their applicants in their admissions data. of $100,000). Demographically, more than 80 percent of applicants report their race as white and more than 70 percent are from the Northeast. Two thirds of applicants to College X are women and in both colleges, women are more likely to not submit their SATI scores. Table 1 indicates that while applicants who choose not to submit an SATI score are more likely to submit an alternative test score, many applicants (especially for College X) choose to submit SATI score as well as other test scores.
Turning to the acceptance and enrollment decisions of colleges and students, we see that internal ratings and acceptance rates are unconditionally higher for students who submit their SATI at College X, relative to those who do not submit their SAT, and unconditionally higher for students who do not submit their SATIs at College Y, relative to those who do not. For College Y, this is surprising, given that observable characteristics are generally worse for students who do not submit 13 There are 35 AP exams available, administered through the College Board. While it is not required, most students take a year long AP course in high school before taking the exam (see http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/student/testing/ap/AP-bulletin.pdf accessed 4/16/07). 14 Based on the data, a few applicants appear not to have satisfied these requirements. their SATIs. In both colleges, students who did not submit their SATI scores are more likely to enroll than students who did and their SATI scores are lower conditional on acceptance and enrollment.
Finally, only a small percent of students apply early decision, seven percent of College X applicants and ten percent of College Y applicants. However, consistent with the policy's intentions, in numbers not shown in Table 1 , more than 95 percent of students accepted in the early decision process enroll and approximately 28 percent of the freshman class is comprised of early decision applicants.
III. College's Acceptance Decision
3.A Model
In this section, we specify a college's objective function to explain their acceptance decisions. The college's acceptance decision provides a measurable outcome for whether the colleges underestimate the relationship between the applicant's decision not to submit and her actual SAT score.
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In our model, the college considers how its acceptance decisions affect the expected "quality" of the current and future student body. An individual student's quality depends on the ability level of the student prior to attending the college and how much value added the college provides through academic quality and demographic diversity, which in turn depends on the composition of the student body. The applicant provides the college with a great deal of information that the college can use to judge these qualities. In the case of an applicant who chooses not to submit an SATI score, the college's expectation of the applicant's quality depends on its inference about her SATI score. We assume that the college does not make inferences over ACT or SATII scores if they are not provided by the student because most applicants do not take any specific SATII exam or the ACT. Instead, the colleges infer that applicants who did not report an SATII score (of which there are 20 of these subject exams) or an ACT score did not take those exams.
Current acceptance decisions influence future student body quality because they affect the reputation and external ranking of the school. A college's ranking, by organizations such as U.S.
News and World Report, depends on the quality of the enrolled students, based on measured outcomes like high school performance and standardized test scores. An optional SATI policy potentially influences these ratings because the average SATI score reported to these ranking organizations is based on the scores of students who submit them. These policies generate a potential wedge between the ability of the enrolled students, as measured by their SATI scores, and the "reported" ability. During the time of our data, the college's yield rate, defined as the fraction of accepted applicants that choose to enroll, also affected rankings.
With this setting, the college's objective function depends on the perceived ability of the incoming students, the "reported" ability of these students, the demographic characteristics of the student body, and the yield rate. Specifically, we assume that the college's objective function is such that the college accepts applicant i if the expected payoff from accepting applicant i exceeds the payoff from rejecting applicant i:
where i EP denotes the expected probability an accepted applicant i enrolls. 16 Estimates of a model that endogenizes the applicant's decisions and allows the probability of enrolling to depend on whether the applicant applies early decision or submits is contained in Table 5 . The payoffs for the college are similar when applicant i is accepted but chooses not to enroll as when applicant i is rejected, except for the college's expected yield rate. We denote the expected yield rate if applicant i is accepted (rejected) by YR ai (YR ri ) and how the yield rate affects the college's expected payoff by f(•). The variable ε qi represents aspects of applicant i's perceived quality which the college observes but we do not, including factors such as how well the applicant performed in her interview, discussions with her high school guidance counselor, and recommendation letters.
Within this model, a cutoff SATI score exists for applicants who submit their SATI score, such that, conditional on the applicant's observables and unobservables, the college accepts the applicant only if her SATI score is above the cutoff. Likewise, for applicants who chose not to submit their SATI score, a cutoff inferred SATI score exists where the college accepts the applicant only if the inferred SATI score is above the cutoff, conditional on the applicant's observables and unobservables.
3.B Likelihood Function
We construct a likelihood function by first parameterizing the college's inference for those applicants who do not submit SATI scores. The inferred score is a weighted average of the college's belief of the SATI score if the college correctly updates its beliefs about the score based on applicant i's decision to withhold it, SAT i,cond ; and the college's belief of applicant i's SATI score if the college ignores the correlation between the decision to withhold the score and the actual score, SAT i,un .
Following Eyster and Rabin's (2005) 
is the weight the college places on the applicant's "unconditional" SATI score when making this inference and, therefore, the college's belief of applicant i's SAT score if she does not submit is χ SAT i,un + (1-χ )SAT i,cond . If the college does not condition on applicant i's decision to withhold her score, we assume that the college's belief of her SATI score is based on all the other information the college has on the applicant and how that information is correlated with the SATI scores for applicants who do submit their scores.
Specifically, SAT i,un =g(Z i |submit)+ ε i,un where we estimate the function g(Z i |submit) based on information from those applicants who submit and ε i,un is a random component capturing information the college uses to infer SATI scores for applicant i but which we do not observe.
If the colleges do condition on applicant i not submitting, we assume that they have unbiased expectations of these applicants' actual SATI scores, due to the colleges' extensive information on and experience with applicants. While unbiased, the colleges are unable to perfectly infer SATI scores for applicants who do not submit and, therefore, we allow SAT i,cond to equal applicant i's actual SATI score plus a random component, ε i,cond .
To obtain a likelihood function with this parameterization of how the colleges infer SATI scores, we must also impose functional form restrictions. For simplicity, we assume that for each applicant i: where ∈ , , ) and the probability applicant i enrolls if accepted. We can express these differences, Z +i
, as a function of characteristic j of individual applicant i if we assume that the college's expectations of the characteristics and size of the student body, as well as the number of applicants accepted and the college's yield rate, do not vary across applicants. We believe this assumption is reasonable because the expected size of the student body is relatively large making it unlikely that a single applicant could change the student body characteristics appreciably. can represent the probability applicant i is accepted as a function of her observables and the college's expectation of her enrolling. Specifically, the probability applicant i is accepted if she submits is:
where: applicant i submitted her SATI score, the estimated coefficient associated with her SATI score would
The acceptance probability of an applicant who did not submit is similar to an applicant who submits except her perceived score is the weighted sum of the unconditional and conditional SATI scores: χ SAT i,un +(1-χ )SAT i,cond where SAT i,un = α•Z i |submit +ε i,un and SAT i,cond =SAT i + ε i,cond . In 18 In addition, it would be empirically intractable to take into account how these characteristics of the expected student body differ across applicants when making acceptance decisions.
addition, her actual SATI score would not influence the average student body SATI score the college reports to the ranking organizations. Due to the random components associated with SAT i,un and SAT i,cond , the probability applicant i is accepted if she does not submits is:
Along with the functional form assumptions, we assume that the population distributions are independent, ε qi ~N(0,1), ε i,un ~N(0,σ u 2 ) and ε i,cond ~N(0,σ c 2 ). Finally, for simplicity we use whether the applicant applies early decision, ED i , to proxy for the inverse of the probability she enrolls conditional on being accepted, i EP .
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Given these functional form, distributional, and parameterization assumptions, we obtain the following likelihood function where y a =1 if applicant i is accepted and y s =1 if applicant i submits (equal 0 otherwise).
By maximizing the above likelihood function, our goal is to estimate a vector of structural
and β
YR'
}.
3.C Identification
The likelihood function is a standard probit model except fitted values ( ) are used when constructing the college's inference for those who do not submit and the variance of the error term is not one for applicants who do not submit. Specifically we can write the college's acceptance decision for those who submit and those who do not by combining the two probabilities in equations 
There are three primary identification issues to discuss. The first involves how each particular applicant characteristic affects the college's acceptance decision and how this effect varies depending on whether the applicant submits an SATI score. Another involves the variation in the difference between the predicted and actual SATI scores, for those who do not submit, which identifies χ . The final identification issue involves our assumption that ν i is uncorrelated with the applicant's decision to submit and the difference between the predicted and actual SATI scores for those who do not submit.
In the model, if the applicant submits an SATI score, the effect of her personal characteristics on acceptance are entirely captured by the coefficient estimates (β
and/or
) representing the colleges' payoff. If an applicant does not submit her SATI score, her personal characteristics play two roles in influencing the probability of acceptance. The first is directly through the effect on the college payoffs, similar to applicants who submit an SATI score. In addition, each characteristic can indirectly influence the college's inference of her SATI score if the college believes that the characteristic is highly correlated with SATI score. By specifying g(Z i |submit) = α•Z i |submit, we assume that the college's inference of these correlations are based on those applicants who do submit. For example, suppose SATI scores are positively correlated with SATII scores and high school performance but uncorrelated with legacy status (whether a close relative attended the school) among students who submit their scores. In this case, we assume the college will infer a relatively high SATI score for an applicant with a high SATII score and an A+ on high school grades for applicants who choose not to submit. Ultimately, the college's acceptance decision should be based more on SATII scores and high school performance and less on legacy status than for applicants who submit.
The variation that identifies the parameters related to the actual and perceived SATI scores
SAT and χ ) is made evident by noting that we can rewrite the latent acceptance decision in [7] as:
Rewritten in this manner, it is clear that the identification of β P' SAT +β R' SAT and β P'
SAT arises from the variation in actual SATI scores for applicants who submit and the variation in actual SATI scores who do not submit, respectively. Identification for the main parameter of interest, χ , comes from variation in •Z i -SAT i : the difference between predicted and actual SATI scores for those who do not submit.
The identification assumption that is of greatest concern involves the random component of the applicant's perceived ability level (ε qi ) being uncorrelated with the difference between predicted and actual SATI scores for applicants who choose not to submit. Violating this assumption would result in ν i being correlated with •Z i -SAT i , which in turn would bias our estimate of χ . Another concern, which would result in biased parameter estimates, is ε qi , ε i,un and/or ε i,cond being correlated with the applicant's decision of whether or not to submit. These correlations are likely to exist if the colleges observe applicant attributes that we do not and these attributes are correlated with the college's perception of the applicant's quality, the difference between applicant's predicted and actual SATI scores, and the applicant's submission decision. We address these concerns in Section IV by using information on the applicants' academic and personal scores given by the colleges' admission departments and the college performance for those applicants who chose to attend. Table 2 reports the estimates of the structural parameters θ = { χ , β
3.D Parameter Estimates
YR'
} from maximizing the likelihood function in equation [6] , with standard errors in parentheses. Our primary parameter of interest is χ which represents the degree to which the college underestimates the relationship between an applicant's decision not to submit and her actual SATI score. The estimates of 0.260 and 0.267 suggest that, while the admission departments at the colleges do condition on the fact that an applicant decision to not submit is related to her actual SATI score, they underestimate this relationship when making inference on the applicant's SATI score. To provide some context to these estimates, the average SATI score for the 1107 College X applicants who do not submit is 1139 and, based on the α estimates, the average predicted SATI score for these applicants is 1215. Therefore, the estimate of 0.260 suggests that the admission department infers an average SATI score of .260*1215+(1-.260)*1139=1159 for those applicants who do not submit. In terms of the 868 College Y applicants who did not submit, their average SATI score is 1228, the average predicted SATI score is 1265, and the college infers an average score of 1238. The null hypothesis that the college does not underestimate this relationship (i.e., χ =0) can be rejected at the one percent significance level for College Y but cannot be rejected at standard levels for College X.
These lower inferred scores are consistent with, in Eyster and Rabin's terminology, the colleges being partially cursed but not fully cursed because these inferred scores are less than the actual scores but greater than those predicted if the college did not condition at all on the applicants' decisions not to submit.
Other estimates of interest include how an applicant's actual or perceived SATI score affects the probability of acceptance. The positive coefficient estimates associated with submitted SATI score and inferred SATI score indicate that a 100 point increase in either score increases the probability of acceptance by approximately 0.09 for College X and 0.19 for College Y. These are large increases, relative to the mean acceptance rates of 0.40 to 0.45. It is somewhat surprising that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient associated with a submitted SATI score (estimate
SAT ) is the same as the coefficient associated with inferred SATI score (estimate of
SAT ). We hypothesized that the coefficient associated with the submitted SATI score would be larger or, equivalently, the estimate of β R' SAT would be positive because a submitted SATI score affects both the expected quality of the enrolled applicant and the average SATI score the college reports to the ranking organizations, while the inferred SATI score only affects the expected quality.
A possible explanation for why our estimate of β R' SATI is not positive is that the applicants' unobservables are correlated with the decision to submit. We empirically address this issue, along with whether our estimate of χ is biased due to the applicants' unobservables, in Section IV.
The estimates of α reported in Table 2 indicate that while high school gpa and class rank are positively correlated with SATI score, the relationship between SATI score and average SATII score is stronger. For applicants who submit an SATI score, a one standard deviation increase in the average SATII score (approximately 70 points) increases the applicant's expected SATI score by over 100 points for both colleges. Table 2 also indicates that attending a private high school and being a legacy are not highly correlated with the SATI score of applicants who submit; however, being white is positively and statistically significantly correlated with SATI scores. Recall that these correlations may indirectly affect the probability of acceptance for students who do not submit an SATI score because they influence the college's inference about the SATI score.
As for the other coefficient estimates associated with the colleges' objective functions, they suggest admission departments are interested in the quality and the diversity of the student body. For example, applicants with high SAT test scores and superior high school performance (gpa and class rank) at a private high school are more likely to be admitted. The fact that a much larger fraction of College X applicants are female explains why female candidates are less likely to be accepted by College X but not by College Y. As expected, legacies are also more likely to be accepted by both colleges. Finally, the desire to achieve some sort of economic and racial diversity in the student body may explains why College X is much more likely to accept a non-white applicant with family income less than $100,000. While more likely to accept a non-white applicant, College Y is less likely to accept lower income applicants.
IV. Identification Assumptions and Robustness
As mentioned in Section III, our primary identification concern is the model's random components, ν i , being uncorrelated with the difference between predicted and actual SATI scores,
Suppose, for example, the college observes positive attributes of applicants who do not submit and who's predicted SATI scores are much larger than their actual SATI scores and these attributes are not observable to us. In this case, these applicants should more likely be accepted and our estimate of χ would be biased upward. We test this identification assumption with additional data we have on the college's internal applicant ratings and subsequent student performance measures.
First, we consider whether including the college's internal personal/non-academic ranking as a covariate alters our results. We assume this non-academic ranking captures other applicant characteristics that we do not observe such as her interview and recommendation letters, but is not influenced by the SATI inference. As a practical matter, College Y reports a non-academic rating on a 2 point scale directly and we generate a non-academic rating for College X's by subtracting the reported academic ranking (on a scale of 7) from the overall ranking (on a scale of 7).
The first two columns in Table 3 report estimates of the key coefficients when we include the non-academic rating as a covariate in the colleges' objective function and the colleges' predicted SATI score. First note that while the non-academic rating significantly increases the probability of acceptance, it does not increase the predicted SATI score. More importantly, including the non-academic rating as a covariate does not appreciably change the estimates of χ . While the college's internal non-academic score is not a precise measure of the information we do not observe, these results suggests that our estimates of χ in Table 3 are not biased due to non-academic unobservables being correlated with the difference between predicted and actual SATI scores.
Unlike the nonacademic rating, we expect that underestimating the relationship between an applicant's decision not to submit and their actual SATI score will not only have an effect when the colleges make acceptance decisions but also when the colleges assign academic rankings. The estimates in the third and fourth columns of Table 3 suggest this is indeed the case. Including the academic rating as a covariate significantly changes the estimates of χ and a higher academic rating increases both the probability of acceptance as well as the predicted SATI score. We further explore this issue by estimating a linear model for the academic ranking with the same functional form as the acceptance decision and an error term which has a normal distribution.
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The statistically significant estimates of χ from this model are contained in the last two columns of Table 3 and are 0.358 for College X and 0.286 for College Y. These χ estimates are similar to those in Table 2 and suggest that the colleges underestimate the relationship between an applicant's decision not to submit and their actual SATI score when making acceptance decisions as well as when assigning academic rankings. Table 4 contains the most relevant estimates from a likelihood function using college performance measures as the outcome variable instead of the acceptance decision. We hypothesize that if there is an unobservable characteristic that is correlated with our covariate of interest, the difference between predicted and actual SATI scores, it should manifest itself in a similar estimate for the relationship between the covariate and the subsequent performance of the enrolled students.
The performance measures for College X include gpa at college graduation, whether the applicant 20 Specifically, the academic ranking equals γ
ED i +ε R where γ's are parameters to be estimated and ε R~N (0,σ R ).
graduated, recipient of honor or distinction in major, Phi Beta Kappa recipient, Summa or Magna Cum Laude recipient and number of collegiate sports. The college performance measure are more limited for College Y -just freshman year gpa, whether the student completed the freshman year and number of collegiate sports. Similar to the academic rating specification, we assume a linear model when the performance measure is gpa or number of collegiate sports with the same functional form as the acceptance decision and an error term which has a normal distribution. We estimate a likelihood function similar to that for acceptance when the performance measure is a dichotomous variable.
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As Table 4 indicates, the estimates corresponding to χ vary in sign depending on the performance measure and are never statistically significant. With the caveat of smaller sample sizes among enrolled students, the lack of a consistently positive estimate of χ suggests that our estimates of χ from the acceptance decision specifications are not biased due to the difference in predicted and actual SATI scores being correlated with favorable academic characteristics only observable to the college.
While the results in Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence in support of the identification assumption of greatest concern, we also test the robustness of our structural estimation results along two other dimensions. First, we consider whether our results change if the college's belief of the withheld SATI score is based on the correlations between the SATI scores and other characteristics for all applicants; not just applicants who choose to submit. Specifically, we assume SAT i,un = α•Z i + ε i,un where the estimates of α are based on information from all applicants. Table 5 presents the estimates of χ , β P'
SAT +β R' SAT and β P'
SAT from this specification. Constructing the predicted values in this way does not change any of the parameter estimates appreciably, primarily because the correlation between SATI scores and other characteristics of the applicants varies little based on whether the applicant submits SATI scores.
The final robustness check endogenizes the applicants' decision of whether to apply early decision, whether to submit her SATI scores and, conditional on acceptance, whether to enroll.
While the applicant makes choices that maximize her expected utility, the college bases its acceptance decision on the objective function parameterization, as well as function form and distributional assumptions presented in Sections II and III. Modeling the applicant's decisions allows us to estimate the probability an applicant enrolls conditional on being accepted and, therefore, we do not use whether the applicant applies early decision as a proxy for this probability.
The model permits us to derive parametric expressions, as a function of observed data and structural parameters, for the probabilities an applicant applies early decision and/or submits her SATI score, the probability the college accepts an applicant, and the probability an applicant enrolls. A detailed description of the model, the derived likelihood function and the estimation is available from the authors. The estimates of the most relevant parameters, obtained by estimating this model are presented in Table 5 . Note that the estimate are similar to those in Table 2 ; most notably, the estimate of χ is 0.262 for College X and 0.349 for College Y. This is expected because the variation that identifies these parameters in our base specification is the same variation that identifies these parameters when we incorporate the applicant's decisions in the estimation.
An advantage of estimating a model that incorporates the applicant's enrollment decision is that we can better address counterfactuals involving student body composition. The two counterfactuals are: (i) if the colleges were not partially cursed and, therefore, did not underestimate the relationship between an applicant's decision not to submit SATI scores and the applicant's actual score (i.e., χ =0); and (ii) if all applicants were required to submit their SATI scores. Our simulations for both counterfactuals indicate that both the fraction of applicants who are accepted and the fraction who enroll decrease slightly for both colleges, compared to those predicted by the model. However, both counterfactuals would only minimally affect the student body characteristics and academic performance. While our estimates suggest that the colleges do underestimate the relationship between an applicant's decision to submit and her actual SATI score, the student body characteristics and academic performances do not change significantly because the colleges have a great deal of other information upon which to base their acceptance decision and infer SATI scores for those who do not submit.
A robustness test we are not able to conduct is distinguishing between whether the colleges misconstrue how an applicant's actual SATI score affects her decision to submit (applicants' strategies) and/or whether the colleges misconstrue the underlying distribution of SATI scores for applicants who choose not to submit.
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Like Eyster and Rabin's cursed equilibrium framework, we assume that if the college conditions on applicant i not submitting, the colleges have unbiased expectations of the underlying distribution of SATI scores of applicants who choose not to submit.
Empirically distinguishing between this assumption and an assumption that colleges fully understand the link between the applicants' actual score and their decision to reveal their SATI score would requires a restriction on exactly how the colleges misconstrue the distribution of SATI scores.
V. Conclusion
Our empirical estimates in this paper find that colleges underestimate the relationship between an applicant's decision not to submit her SATI score and her actual SATI score, consistent 22 Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2004) model an environment where uninformed players learn about the distribution of other players' types as well as their strategies and consider how this learning is influenced by how informative are the signals received by the uniformed players. This model is relevant for our empirical analysis because the applicant data are from five and six years after College X instituted an optional SATI policy and from the first year after College Y instituted an optional SATI policy. While the admission departments are likely to learn more over time about their pool of applicants and what factors influence the applicants' decision not to submit, the admission departments only observe college performance for those applicants who enroll and many of these observations occur several years after the admissions decisions are made.
with results in the experimental literature on players underestimating the relationship between other players' actions and types. Specifically, our estimates suggest that the colleges partially update their beliefs about the applicants SATI scores based on their decision to withhold them, yet underestimate this relationship when making inference on the applicant's SATI score by 10 to 20 points. This inaccurate inference would not appreciably change the composition of the student body nor would requiring all applicants to submit their SATI scores, primarily because the colleges have a great deal of other information to base their acceptance decision and to infer SATI scores. Given the arguments made by colleges for adopting these policies, which are often to increase the number of underrepresented students, these estimates suggest that the ability to infer SAT scores is so high, the admissions' margin is not where the colleges will accomplish their stated goal of increased diversity.
The pool of applicants may be another margin over which the optional SAT policy could affect the student body, but our data from only the period when the colleges have the optional SAT policy in place do not allow us to address this.
If players do systematical underestimate the relationship between other players' actions and types, it has implications for all games with private information including the common value auctions, bilateral trade, voting and signaling games discussed in Eyster and Rabin (2005) .
Assuming a similar level of underestimation as in the optional SATI environment, we would expect "cursedness" to have a much more significant economic impact in these other situations because players in other games are unlikely to have access to the enormous amount of information colleges have on applicants. With less public information, misconstruing other players' private information will likely result in larger welfare affects. By taking the first step of estimating "cursedness" in an environment where college applicants choose whether to submit their SATI scores, we provide direction for further empirical analyses focusing on whether and to what extent players underestimate the relationship between other players' actions and types. Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 5% and ** significant at 1%. Table 2 except appropriate rankings added to set of covariates. Non-Academic Rating is Overall Rating minus Academic Rating for College X and Personal Rating for College Y. Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 5% and ** significant at 1%. Table 2 . Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 5% and ** significant at 1%. For alternative parameterization of college's inference, the set of covariates is the same as in Table 2 . Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 5% and ** significant at 1%. 
